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Kuehl, "From Cyberspace to Cyberpower," 4. Image obtained from National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA) Earth Observatory, August 17, 2003, available online at: https://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/images/3719/blackout-leaves-american-cities-in-the-dark.11. Carl von Clausewitz, Michael Howard, Peter Paret, and Bernard Brodie, Captain Jason Simmons and Staff Sergeant Clinton Tips update anti-virus software for Air Force units to assist in the prevention of cyberspace hackers at Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana. Chicago style: Kuehl, Daniel T.. " From Cyberspace to Cyberpower: Defining the Problem. CHAPTER 2 From Cyberspace to Cyberpower: Defining the Problem.
Aaron Smith, “Attitudes about Cybersecurity Policy,” last modified January 26, 2017, https://www.pewinternet.org/2017/01/26/3-attitudes-about-cybersecurity-policy/.21. Do skills and expertise cost the offense or defense more? Daniel T. Kuehl, “From Cyberspace to Cyberpower,” in Cyberpower and National Security, by Franklin D. Kramer et al., (National Defense University Press, 2009), 28. In cyberspace, the first belief is found in the perception that espionage and disruption strategies are profitable as they are both cheap. Matthew Monte, Network Attacks and Exploitation: A Framework (Indianapolis: Wiley, 2015), 56.13. However, these strategies do not degrade networks or network systems to any lasting or physical degree. It is widely accepted that espionage and disruption strategies often employ cheaply conducted operations and as a result the balance of costs favors the offense. 3 (1999): 382 – 383. From Cyberspace to Cyberpower: Defining the Problem . Determining an offensive or defensive advantage is one of two variables Jervis observes as influencing the balance. Cyberpower and National Security: Policy Recommendations for a Strategic Framework Franklin D. Kramer; From Cyberspace to Cyberpower: Defining the Problem Daniel T. Kuehl; Toward a Preliminary Theory of Cyberpower Stuart H. Starr; Part II.
at 1. “cyberpower is the ability to use cyberspace to create ad vantages and influence events in other operational environments and across the i nstruments of power” ( Kuehl, 2009). h�bbd``b`�3��+�`�$�"��7��� �`+D m��@��&F�� S�%��_� � �e! This view stems from the perception that in order to be successful, the defense must counter all attacks, whereas the attacker merely needs to find a single entry point to exploit in order to be successful.The matter of technology is another mechanism that Jervis applies to determine an advantage between the offense and defense. Valeriano and Jensen, “The Myth of the Cyber Offense,” 4-5. https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/myth-cyber-offense-case-restraint.Of the 272 recorded cyber operations between opposing states from 2000 to 2016, only 40 (~14%) degraded or sabotaged networks or systems in any significant manner. Robert Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” © 2016 Yale Journal of International Affairs
Corpus ID: 107907134. With more than two dozen contributors, Cyberpower and National Security covers it all.Information Security Issues in CyberspaceToward a Preliminary Theory of CyberpowerInternational Law and Information OperationsThe premier professional military and academic publishing house Some features of the site may not work correctly.Cyber Security Threats and Vulnerabilities: A Systematic Mapping StudyAugmented Cognition. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press.”]Daniel Kuehl, From Cyberspace to Cyberpower: Defining the Problem (2009). Spade defines As a result, the second problem is that Panetta’s warnings present a fallacy in establishing causal links between opportunity and outcome. In 2012, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta warned that the United States faced the threat of suffering a “cyber-Pearl Harbor,” the effects of which could range from train derailments to power grids being shut down.Terrestrial borders and boundaries do not exist in the information domain, at least not in any manner that mirrors what we see when looking at a map or how Jervis conceptualizes geography and its importance as a contributing factor to the offense-defense balance. Rebecca Slayton, “What is the Cyber Offense-Defense Balance? Jack Snyder, “The Cult of the Offensive in 1914,” in 4. Foundation and overview: Cyberpower and national security: policy recommendations for a strategic framework / Franklin D. Kramer ; From cyberspace to cyberpower: defining the problem / Daniel T. Kuehl ; Toward a preliminary theory of cyberpower … h�b```�Z��|�cb����@�((�g����g�m�g�+��_���5������6�@`�l�j���Q@ʂ����Uټx�Hj&N�;���g�˃�5)�/Ԅ\89�yʍ=
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It has also been suggested that much of U.S. policy in cyberspace has been influenced by misperceptions resulting in a “cult of the offensive” that generates a bias for offensive strategies.
Elisabeth Bumiller and Thom Shanker, “Panetta Warns of Dire Threat of Cyberattack,” This analysis will focus exclusively on degradation when discussing cyberwarfare and the offense/defense balance. In their book The first misperception that feeds incorrect assumptions of offensive advantage in cyber warfare, threat inflation, generates a fear of the destructive potential of cyberattacks. Andrew Radin “Hybrid Warfare in the Baltics: Threats and Potential Responses,” RAND Corporation (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Publishers, 2017), 19.19. The definition conundrum also exists for the term “cyberattacks.” For instance, the Tallinn Manual (a study on international law’s application in cyber conflict and cyber warfare) defines cyberattacks as attacks that are reasonably expected “to cause injury or death to persons or damage or destruction to objects,” and the United States defines it as “actions taken in cyberspace … [2] Daniel T. Kuehl, “From Cyberspace to Cyberpower: Defining the Problem,” in Cyberpower and Cybersecurity, ed. This article explains the logic behind these misperceptions and addresses how they influence assumptions indicating offensive advantages.
For example, a degradation operation targeting the U.S. electrical grid would produce similar effects to that of the 2003 blackout, which impacted a great portion of the northeastern U.S. and Canada.